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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS.—*Am. J. Ps.* = *The American Journal of Psychology; Ar. de Ps.* = *Archives de Psychologie; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie; Br. J. Ps.* = *The British Journal of Psychology; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth.* = *The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods; J. de Psych.* = *Journal de Psychologie; Psych. Bul.* = *Psychological Bulletin; Psych. Rev.* = *Psychological Review; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Rev. Néo-Sc.* = *Revue Néo-Scolastique; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; Rev. de Ph.* = *Revue de Philosophie; R. d. Fil.* = *Rivista di Filosofia e Scienze Affini; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph. u. ph. Kr.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Psych.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane, I. Abtl.: Zeitschrift für Psychologie.* —Other titles are self-explanatory.]

Truth and Its Object. J. E. BOODIN. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 19, pp. 508–21.

We must distinguish reality as the object of our knowledge from reality as our object-construct. By the first is meant the world to which we must adjust ourselves; by the second, the conceptual tools with which we work, such as formulæ and equations. The question whether we can know has a threefold meaning: (1) Can the individual recognize or know an object or event that has occurred once before in his mental history; (2) Can *two* individuals know the same object or meaning; (3) Can physical objects be known? In the first place, we must hold that our belief that we know again our own past states as the same or nearly the same is correct, for without this all knowledge would be impossible. Moreover, empirically speaking, we must admit that two or more individuals are able to know the same object, for only upon this supposition is science possible. As regards nature we can say that it, as we know it, is our social construct; still we must recognize that physical processes are not mere phenomena but have a place in their own context of physical interaction. Though the three contexts—the individual, the social, and the physical—are all related to each other, still Bradley's contention that the object of truth is always reality is a clumsy way of putting the matter, for the object becomes meaningful precisely by being singled out from the rest of reality and being made the center of attention. Our knowledge can never do justice to reality, for reality is a world of process which thought attempts to fix—an impossible task. Still, while there is a conventional element in truth due to the fact that it has to express itself in descriptive symbols, it *means* to be eternal. Knowledge is phenomenal, not because facts are vitiated by being known, nor because we are unable to know the real thing, but because in the process of selection we must omit so much of reality. Still the desire to discover the whole truth of reality remains, and the attempt to accomplish this we call metaphysics.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Huxley's Epiphenomenalism: A Criticism and an Appreciation. EVANDER BRADLEY McGILVARY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 17, pp. 449–460.

Huxley's epiphenomenalism, while indefensible as it stands, is capable of development into a view that is both self-consistent and consistent with the facts. Huxley started by assuming the law of the conservation of energy, that the total energy of any body or system of bodies is a quantity which can neither be increased nor diminished by any mutual action of such bodies. He also postulated the law of causality, by which he meant an invariable order of succession. Now if the conservation of energy applies to physical events alone, then psychical events can follow physical events without violating this law; a brain process may have two effects, one physical, preserving equivalence of energy with its cause, the other psychical, having no energetic relation to its cause. The absence in the latter case of the energetic relation does not necessarily imply the absence of antecedence and consequence in which alone the causal relation consists. In so far Huxley was right, but he was wrong in denying that psychic events can in turn be the cause of brain changes. For example, if we have brain processes A, B, C, with psychical processes x and y always correspondingly to B and C respectively, then since A always precedes B and x, it is the cause of both B and x. Huxley, however, should have gone farther and shown that since both B and x precede C, both together are the cause of C, and that for the same reason both B and x are the cause of y. Should it be objected that C would happen if preceded by B without x, the reply is that this violates the assumption that C is never so preceded. Huxley's theory, as thus developed, would violate neither the law of the conservation of energy nor the law of causality and would at the same time be consistent with itself. It should be said that Huxley himself did not adhere strictly to his view that psychic events cannot be the causes of subsequent physical processes.

C. H. WILLIAMS.

Die Entwicklung der Geschichtsphilosophie W. von Humboldts. LEO EHLEN. Ar. f. G. Ph., XXIV, 1, pp. 22–60.

History is superficially characterized as having for its subject-matter that which is psychical and as dealing exclusively with past occurrences. A philosophy of history involves, on the other hand, a plexus of logic, epistemology, and metaphysics. The development of modern philosophy of history began with the ethical tendencies of the 18th century, which harmonized all conflicting theories of knowledge and metaphysics. Herder attempted this unification by subordinating the mechanical factors to the meaning of history, while Kant caused the factors to assume a teleological aspect. Kant failed to make his conception fruitful because he did not utilize Herder's idea of a superior ordination of events. The most important progress of the 18th century was made when events of history were viewed as a surface revelation of a developing metaphysical undercurrent. In the post-Kantian treatment, *e. g.*, with Fichte and Hegel, the purely mechanical features were transcended and the regulative principle of historical events became constitutive. Nevertheless, the purely mechanical factors were recognized clearly by Hegel, and also by Schiller and Humboldt, as constituting a methodological, instead of a metaphysical problem. With Humboldt, however, came the first attempt to unite the methodological basis of Herder's individualism and Kant's mechanism on an empirical ground, and to use the metaphysical superstructure in a merely speculative manner. Schelling stimulated, but did not contribute directly to the philosophy of history, in that he indicated the possibility of a mechanical conception of history on an epistemological basis, and the usefulness of an empirical and instrumental though not truly historical combination of individualism and teleology. A peculiarity of Humboldt's conception of history is his interest in events as expressions of the human mind, in the variety of this expression, and in the subordination of these to a higher developing ideal. The personal ideals of individuals are subordinated to the ideal of the human race. A second peculiarity lies in the unification of mechanism and teleology in the conception of a world history. He realized that the individual is a superempirically determined organism but limited as a historical phenomenon. But in his conception of man as the expression of an absolute idea, this idea assumes a psychological form, so that that which determines man permits man to determine his acts within the scope of that higher determination. *Der Mensch ist nur ein Mittelglied.* Besides recording events, the historian must classify them under appropriate categories, and here personal character plays its rôle. Instead of Kant's two-fold division of metaphysic, Substance and Causality, we have in Humboldt a three-fold division, Matter, Causality, and the Idea (Substance). The idea gives direction to matter, *e. g.*, determines human action, but this causal relation or direction is a necessity which lies in the nature of matter so that it contributes *per se* to the causal direction. For this reason the individual assumes a double rôle in its ontological essence: it is the originator of no historical event; and yet it is for itself its own absolute. This raises the question whether, after all, history reflects solely the individual and what influence the higher ideal has upon individual action.

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

Vues sur les problèmes de la philosophie. G. SOREL. Rev. de Mét., XVIII, 5, pp. 581–613.

The most fatal misconception of modern times is the idea that philosophy is a sort of empirical science. Physical science and philosophy were identified only so long as both dealt with natural phenomena. From Egypt came the first stimulus toward a supernatural philosophy. The peculiarity of the Greek philosophy was its moral tendency. The Christian philosophy subjected natural philosophy to theology. Soon, however, the discoveries of church hypocrisy in the Reformation led the thoughtful element to resurrect the ancient monuments and to seek in the Stoic philosophers the material for a new morality which was to be more agreeable to kings and peasants. With Descartes, Galileo, and Newton, natural phenomena were not only scientifically investigated and explained, but again also deified as of old. While the anti-scholastic movement was, on the whole, not of philosophical, but of political moment, the successful development of great religious movements and the growth of religious authority turned philosophical minds toward spiritualistic tendencies. The beginning of the 19th century produced an extraordinary return to Christianity, but it was soon found that the newer studies of religion could persevere in their lesser details without seriously interfering with the more essential progress of philosophy: the spiritualistic element was supernumerary. Time and again philosophers have believed that it was their concern to discover the rules for attaining the truth. John Stuart Mill thought he could deduce the methods of experimental reasoning. If philosophy is unable to furnish a code of thought to be used as a basis for scientific research, it is unable to verify the foundations of science. Furthermore, it is clear that the deductions of geometry, for instance, form the groundwork of the fine arts. Philosophy cannot share in the actual work of either science or fine art but it can create an atmosphere eminently favorable to scientific research and artistic production. The success of the Peripatetic Philosophy for so long a time was due to the fact that Aristotle well interpreted and expressed the life of the people. His causal categories were in agreement with enlightened Hellenic and pre-medieval thought. The later weakness of that philosophy consisted in regarding the method of geometry as applicable only to the physical sciences. Christianity had taken the Aristotelian idea of prime mover, converted it into an idea of a Providence, and thus wedded the Platonic immortality to the Aristotelian final cause. With Galileo, the school of geometricians emancipated science from this Peripatetic tendency of causal classification, and developed a new theory of cosmogony. It was more difficult, however, to reform the schools of theology and persuade them to adopt modern conceptions, because they deemed philosophy all too ephemeral. The Cartesian philosophy can be briefly criticised in that it fails to credit empirical evidence and relies purely on logical reasoning. On the other hand, the mechanical explanation of the universe, proposed by Newton, failed because it relied almost entirely on evidence of the senses. With Kant a new movement was inaugurated which outlined, to some extent, the part that reason could play as against the rôle of empirical evidence.

C. A. RUCKMICH.

How Ideas Work. A. W. MOORE. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 23, pp. 617–626.

The idea is a proposed connection of things for a specific end, and is true when it works in the way proposed. It is objected that the idea does not make the connection between the toothache and a tooth, but it simply discovers an existing connection. Here the absolute idealist inconsistently joins the realist against the pragmatist. The latter admits a connection between the ache and the tooth before there is an idea, but he holds that the idea does more than merely symbolize this connection. The tooth takes on a new relation to the ache as soon as the dentist gets hold of it, and the dentist gets hold of it because the tooth acts as a guide to patient and dentist the moment the pain is ideated as the pain of a tooth. The realist thinks that knowledge of the past is the crucial difficulty of the pragmatist. The latter finds it difficult to see how pastness can be a special case of knowledge, since it is involved in every act of thinking, which is a process in which things produced in the past recombine or interact to produce other things. Caesar's example in crossing the Rubicon may influence a man of affairs, and Caesar's act never will be finished so long as it continues, through acts of knowledge, to produce new results. The pragmatist insists that, in becoming known, a past act takes on additional functions and consequences, and he holds that no fixed distinction can be made between an act and its effects. He agrees with the realist that experience does not consist of a system of ideas, and that, at any given time, a fact of experience may be independent of knowledge in the sense that it is not at that time known. But the pragmatist and the realist part company when the unknown experience passes into knowledge. Pragmatism and idealism agree in the conception of the constitutive character of thinking, if idealism does not confine this to *absolute* thinking. In teaching the efficiency of *our* thinking, pragmatism is saving idealism from its own unbelief.

J. REESE LIN.

The Psychology of Belief. JAMES LINDSAY. Ar. f. sys. Ph., XVI, 3, pp. 292–309.

After giving a summary of the teachings of various philosophers with a brief comment on each, the writer states his own theory. Belief is best taken as the assertion of a reflective judgment or determination. It is the psychological side of what, on the logical side, we call judgment. Its consent is compelled. But such belief involves voluntary adaptation to the incontrollable. Nevertheless voluntary control is bound up with our belief, in respect of thought reality, because only by the aid of such voluntary control can ideal ends be attained. The purity and earnestness of the whole thought and life must affect it. Indeed, the foundations of our psychic life rest on belief. While belief is an aspect of judgment, the willing function is present in all cases of belief. Belief is the driving power of knowledge, guiding it, using it, and working out its implications. It is both a fruit of life, and an essential of its development. For belief pours vigor into the affections, no less than it re-inforces will; in its higher forms it is a movement of our being so central and fundamental that its issue is life. There is no ideal without belief. Belief is the grand propulsive power of man's complex nature and activity.

J. REESE LIN.

Some Implications of Anti-Intellectualism. JOHN DEWEY. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 18, 477–481.

Intellectualism, once the antithesis to the sensational theory of knowledge, is now often used in contrast with voluntarism. Anti-intellectualism (pragmatism) has two forms. One form holds that things are what they are known to be, but upholds the supremacy of non-rational factors in our knowledge, and denies an underlying, noumenal reality. The other form attaches more value to logical functions than the first does, and holds that concepts are the only means of making things *intelligible.* But it holds that making things intelligible is a function operating in the interests of behavior, and that intellectualism wrongly isolates the knowledge standpoint from its functional place. The data in such a theory of pragmatism are primary functions, both biological and social. Philosophy is held to be a mode of knowing, which arises out of typical perplexities and conflicts of behavior for the purpose of their solution and adjustment. It holds that the origin, structure, and purpose of knowing are such as to render nugatory any wholesale inquiries into the nature of Being. It avoids the "egocentric predicament," into which intellectualism falls, by holding that, in every knowledge event, the ego is seen to be simply the agent that undertakes and is responsible for the cognitive event; its relation is not that of one of the two terms of knowledge to the other term.

J. REESE LIN.

An Experimental Study of Belief. T. OKABE. Am. J. Ps., XXI, 4, pp. 563–596.

According to Hume, belief or assent is the vivacity, force, and liveliness of the perceptions presented by memory and the senses. It results from the customary conjunction of a lively idea with a present impression. James Mill makes belief an inseparable association, while J. S. Mill adds that there is an ultimate difference between thinking of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary object. Bain holds that belief is an innate credulity which is tempered by checks and influenced by intellectual, emotional, and active factors. In his account, the two most important elements are the emphasis upon the instinctive tendency to accept and the stating of a theory of belief in motor terms. Herbert Spencer, following James Mill, reduces belief to an inseparable association, while Brentano accepts and recasts the doctrine of J. S. Mill. James holds that belief is an emotional reaction of the entire man on an object, a reaction which resists further analysis. He agrees with Bain that the opposite of belief is not disbelief but doubt and inquiry and, like him, emphasizes the primitive impulse to affirm and the motor activity connected with belief. Sully makes belief a compound of intellectual representation, feeling, and active impulse. Baldwin holds that it is a feeling of confirmation and security over and above the feeling of simple reality. It is *sui generis* and attaches to the representation faculty primarily. Stout, who also regards belief as fundamentally distinct from simple apprehension, uses the term belief in a wide sense as interchangeable with judgment. This brief historical review shows that the status of the experience of belief is still very uncertain. Titchener gives belief a place among the intellectual sentiments and suggests a method of investigation. The object of the present study is to describe, in analytical terms, the experience of belief as it appeared under experimental conditions. A method of single exposures was first used, followed by one of paired comparisons. The first method was applied in three forms. In the first series of experiments, the observers were instructed to give an introspective account of the consciousness of belief and disbelief aroused by the exposure of simple type-written sentences. Another series dealt with the consciousness of certainty or uncertainty accompanying the mental solving of simple arithmetical and algebraical problems presented on slips of paper. In the third series of experiments, sentences or mathematical expressions were read aloud to the observers. Two variations of the method of paired comparisons were used. In the first, sentences, and in the second, mathematical expressions, were presented to the vision. A series of experiments with tones was carried out with one observer. At the conclusion of the whole investigation, the experimenter read to each observer a summary statement of his introspections and in each case the analysis was accepted. The following are the chief results of the experiments. The belief-disbelief consciousness, as something more than a quasi-mechanical acceptance or rejection, is not of common occurrence in ordinary life, yet it may appear fairly regularly under experimental conditions. While not regularly emotional in character, this consciousness may be markedly affective. This consciousness may be given in terms of a general kinæsthetic attitude, or of internal speech and localized kinæsthesis, or of the mutual relations of visual images, in which case the contents come to the observer as being, specifically, belief. If bound up with a particular consciousness, verbal or visual, the contents of the experience do not come to the observer as being, specifically, belief, but as the vehicle of belief, which itself finds conscious representation only in the mode of occurrence of the contents. Belief and disbelief are consciousnesses of the same kind. The certainty-uncertainty consciousness is, in general, more strongly affective than that of belief-disbelief. Certainty is pleasant, doubt, unpleasant.

J. R. TUTTLE.

La fonction de la philosophie dans la science positive. F. MAUGÉ. Rev. Ph., XXXV, 8, pp. 113–142.

In a union of science and philosophy having as its end the explanation and systematization of experience, what is the distinct rôle philosophy would play? Comte would make its speciality that of generalities. Cl. Bernard objects that this is both anti-philosophic and anti-scientific. M. Rey fears the vulgarization of science. Such a systematization would be but a classification of scientific theories only serving to show the conflict of ideas. Scientists would hold that experience by its very nature gives us a synthesis. But have scientists admitted that the various results of experimentation are sufficient by themselves or that such results merely control the determination of theories which in turn influence the direction of further experimentation? Poincaré holds that the truth of a theory must have general utility; Duhem, that any experiment has demonstrative value only if it integrates itself into a preconceived, theoretical unity. Cl. Bernard and Newton decided that, in addition to a mere recognition of facts, a method founded on reason, superior to experimentation is necessary, and Newton's inductive method is but a rationalization of experience. Results can be obtained only through the use of preconceived ideas since the principles can never be applied to all facts, though their applicability gives them their value. For Aristotle, who sees in induction the condensation in general rules of many experiments and for whom the principles of science consist in such rules, these principles seem to arise from experience itself; for Descartes they result from reason alone. Newton derives the principles of science from both reason and experience. They are selected facts and as such are the products of experiments, but as scientific values they pass beyond the range of experimentation. Likewise among modern scientists, principles are both empirical and *a priori.* They imply an analysis of the real but must be orientated according to a determined meaning. The principles of positive sciences imply most frequently preconceived ideas, which have their root in experience and are justifiable by it, but whose germ is found in a presentiment of their fertility. If science can progress only by aid of such preconceived conceptions, philosophy is to coördinate these ideas and establish a system of rational presuppositions. In the work of scientists who seem best to embody the scientific spirit, one finds a distinction between what results from experimentation and what fulfills a methodological requirement. Science can put the questions to nature; philosophy can coördinate them in a system according to their necessary relation to one ideal and form a basis of a broad interrogatory of which all the parts are harmonious and for which experimentation can furnish the answers.

CORINNE STEPHENSON.

Das Subjekt und die Wirklichkeit. BERNARDINO VARISCO. Logos, I, 2, pp. 197–206.

A subject is the unity of its thoughts. A judgment is always made by a single subject, though not dependent on any particular subject. I am, in so far as I think, and my thought is real or nothing is real. Indeed, my thought creates reality. Solipsism is avoided by the recognition of other subjects and of a material or outer world. This outer world, however, has less reality for a particular subject than its own inner world, since to the latter belong all mental activities, and its kernel is self-consciousness. The ability to differentiate an ego and a non-ego denotes that these realities are but parts of a greater unity, which, to have reality, must have all these parts organically related in itself. Every unity of consciousness is a center of reality, though not of reality as a whole, for that is polycentric and any focus of reciprocal action is one of these centers. Reality is neither outside the subject nor a part of any individual subject, since it includes more subjects in itself. Neither is a subject part of reality in the same sense that a leaf is part of a book. Between the individual and the whole, even as between different individuals, there must be an organic relation.

CORRINNE STEPHENSON.

Zur Psychologie der Erregungs- und Rauschzustände. RICHARD MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. Z. f. Psych., LVII, 3, pp. 161–194.

The study is an attempt to analyze the peculiar supra-normal states of consciousness characterized by excessive feelings, irregular ideational processes, hypersensitivity, extraordinary transitoriness, a peculiar shift of temporal relations, and a change of attention from clear to obscure. These states are studied from the points of view of affection, intellection, and æsthetic appreciation. The shifts in the affective life are especially frequent in the case of feelings of pleasantness. One of the most frequent shifts is in the long duration of affection which we call mood. A mood, though sometimes unpleasant, is generally a pleasant feeling which in small intensity lasts a long time. If intensity is increased it becomes an emotion. If the emotion last a long time, the conscious state is then not a unitary one, but is subject to all fluctuations of intensity and quality. A strong feeling is an emotion, which, if it lasts long, loses its unitary aspect, and approaches now more toward the impulsive, now more toward ideational complexes. The states of excitation may occur without any definite connection with definite ideas and are aroused by the most trivial things. Under these conditions the function of reasoning is inhibited in a way similar to that brought about by certain toxins. Music has at times a like effect, as in the arresting of self-control. Organic changes, increased vasomotor activity, glowing cheeks, etc., are artificially induced by certain movements, as in religious observances. Thus the Egyptians in repeating the word "Allah," make unceasing movements of the head and body and the Dervishes likewise make continuous movement in prayer. The result is a kind of intoxication followed by a peculiar insensibility. On the other hand, absolute immovability or voluntary control of the breathing and circulation induces a kind of hypnotic condition as in the case of the Yogi of India. This result may also be brought about by certain monotonous noises, such as the singing of certain sentences and the recitation of magic words or by certain chemicals such as alcohol and tobacco. Opium produces visions with the most pleasant of feelings. In certain intoxications, for example, ecstacy, the ideational life is almost minimal. In connection with these affective states there is a change in the consciousness of self, even an entire forgetting of the normal state, and a feeling of unity with the Godhead. Such cases are found among the mystics. Intellectual activity does not always accompany increased affective life. Sometimes a complete insensibility towards the strongest external stimuli occurs, in other cases a stupid thoughtlessness ensues. In some moments, however, there is a clearness of ideas amounting almost to hallucination. The cause is assumed to be hyperemia of the cortex such as is produced by toxic substances. Controlling judgments and apperception are excluded. The most essential difference between the abnormal and the normal states is the speed of ideational trains. In the former states, images and thought chase each other without diminution of clearness. In these abnormal states the field is to be compared with the visual field of the microscope in which first one part then another comes into focus. The flight of ideas differs, however, from that of the maniac. Memory seems at times to be greatly extended. On the æsthetic side we find that rhythm is used to arouse these states both in music and poetry. The rhythm of poetry produces an easily sliding, pleasant dance of passing imagination. The physical effects of the fine arts is less clear. Colors have a marked livening effect, which, however, is never rhythmical because their impressions are necessarily simultaneous. Not only artistic enjoyment but creation produce these effects.

AUSTIN S. EDWARDS.

Knowledge and Volition. DE WITT H. PARKER. J. of Ph., Psy., and Sci. Meth., VII, 22, pp. 594–602.

The problem of the relation of knowledge and volition is important in modern epistemology. Rickert in Germany, Royce and Münsterberg in America, are the most prominent of those who have offered a solution. They all argue —with differences of detail—that knowledge is affirmation of ideas, and this affirmation is an act of will. For Rickert, assertion, although voluntary, is not capricious, but is determined by an intellectual "ought," which manifests itself in the feeling of certainty. Royce accepts in general Rickert's analysis. For him the intellectual ought is valid if it expresses the will, but this will is ultimately the will of the absolute, with which we feel ourselves identical, whenever we experience the certainty belonging to all true ideas. Rickert wrongly separates the element of assertion from the idea, in which it is really inherent. He also regards the assertion as determined by a preceding feeling of certainty, whereas the certainty does not precede, but accompanies it. Further, it is impossible, as Royce maintains, to identify the meaning of an idea with the will of an idea. If ideas could not assert an object apart from the will, there would never be a choice of possible courses of action. An idea is true so far as it can be filled out in perception, and the truth-character of an idea is determinative of the feeling of certainty which accompanies it as its value.

M. E. GOUDGE.

Reactions to Rhythmic Stimuli, with Attempt to Synchronize. KNIGHT DUNLAP. Psych. Rev., XVII, 6, pp. 399–416.

These experiments are the beginning of a work on rhythmic reactions which was suggested by the results obtained in the so-called 'complication experiment,' where the phenomena of the experiment depended on an indirect attempt of the subject to synchronize the reaction with the stimulus. The apparatus consisted of a reaction-key, a Schumann chronograph with motor attachment, and the stimulus, which was either the snap of an electric spark, or the illumination of a white screen by a flash from a helium tube. The stimulus rates varied from one-third to two and one-fourth seconds. The subject's room was darkened, and no noise from the apparatus in the experimenter's room reached it. Nearly 7000 reactions were taken with five subjects. The series taken show that there was no relation between the average error and the rate of the stimulus, and that the reaction was not different in those cases where there was alternate change of attention to the stimulus and the reaction. The results are, in general, similar to those of the complication experiment.

M. E. GOUDGE.

The Play Impulse and Attitude in Religion. C. E. SEASHORE. Am. J. Th., XIV, 4, pp. 505–520.

Play is that which we do for the pleasure of doing it. In this sense play is coextensive with activity, and manifests itself in all genuine art and in much scientific research. With development it becomes purposive. It then develops mind and body more than work does. Both religion and play supply an ultra-rational basis for conduct. Play is a preparation for religious life and has a large share in its realizations. The best of religion is spontaneous; that is, playful. The two agree in demanding a sense of freedom; in involving the feelings of fascination, of the extension of personality; and in arousing the sense of fellowship. Both are fundamentally serious. Both are anthropomorphic in the interpretation of their objects. These analogies, each of small import, are collectively of the greatest significance. Some may consider that this position is a trifling with religion, but in reality it sets forth an important point of view. However, all of religion is not play.

NORBERT WIENER.